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This article examines the sustainability of European and SADC States’ practice of 
agreeing bilateral investment agreements (BITs) for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments in light of the latter's recent inauguration of black economic 
empowerment (BEE) as a basic norm of regional customary international law (CIL) 
and strategy for countering the social and economic legacy of apartheid-rule on their 
territories for over half a century. It reveals strong elements of exclusivity between 
those BITs' dispute settlement mechanisms and the “ouster clauses” of SADC BEE 
legislation and regulations. The mutual incompatibility between the aspirations and 
expectations of the foreign direct investment (FDI) seeking SADC States on the one 
hand; and on the other, the investor-sending European nations makes for a 
problematic and unsustainable union. The article recommends a mutual reappraisal 
of European/SADC BIT dispute settlement mechanisms in order to optimize BEE's 






SADC States have steadily inaugurated BEE as a regional norm of CIL
2
 and strategy 
to counter the economic and social legacy of apartheid-rule for over half a century on 
their territories. BEE is habitually justified on practical and juristic grounds. Severe 
apartheid policies in some member States parties of the SADC had vandalised and 
scandalised black populations and reduced them to quasi-slaves for the settler 
European population. The United Nations (UN) steadily outlawed apartheid-rule by 
legislating against it through treaties and declarations that eventually culminated in 
the inauguration of jus cogens, namely, a norm so critical to international order that no 
State is permitted to derogate from it. UN legislation that served to expedite this 
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 Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, 5 RADIC (1993) p.415. 
2
  See also Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru) ICJ Reports 1950 p.266. 
process includes the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965);
3
 International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973);
4
 and The International Convention 
against Apartheid in Sports (1985).
 5 
 
John Dugard, arguably the foremost commentator on this subject has observed that: 
Apartheid was annually condemned by the General Assembly as contrary to Articles 55 and 
56 of the Charter of the United Nations from 1952 until 1990; and was regularly condemned 
by the Security Council after 1960. In 1966, the General Assembly labelled apartheid as a 
crime against humanity (resolution 2202 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966) and in 1984 the 
Security Council endorsed this determination (resolution 556 (1984) of 23 October 1984). The 
Apartheid Convention was the ultimate step in the condemnation of apartheid as it not only 
declared that apartheid was unlawful because it violated the Charter of the United Nations, but 
in addition it declared apartheid to be criminal. The Apartheid Convention was adopted by the 
General Assembly on 30 November 1973, by 91 votes in favour, four against (Portugal, South 
Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 26 abstentions. It came into force on 
18 July 1976. As of August 2008, it has been ratified by 107 States.
6 
 
To have attracted this amount of negative and even hostile attention of the organs of 
the UN - from the General Assembly to the Security Council; and to have become one 
of the standing features on the annual reviews of UN agencies, apartheid policies in 
the SADC must have approached dire, even diabolical proportions. Particularly in 
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South West Africa (Namibia), and South Africa, the social and 
economic legacy of apartheid-rule are still dominant and in some cases resilient 
enough against the policies of the new democratic dispensation. This situation 
threatens the possible achievement of the decency and normalcy that had been hoped 
for through UN criminalisation of apartheid. Therefore, European nations that enter 
BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments with SADC States may 
do well to note this challenge and perhaps incline themselves toward facilitation of 




                         
3
  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) December 21, 1965. 
4
  General Assembly resolution 3068 (XXVIII), 30 November 1973. 
5
  United Nations, Treaty Series vol. 1500, p. 161 - adopted by the General Assembly on 10 
December 1985 and came into force on 3 April 1988. 
6
  John Dugard ‘Convention on the suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid’  
(2008) United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law .  Available at www.un.org/law/avl 
7
  In this connection see especially L. Henkin,  How Nations Behave(2
nd
 edn. Columbia 
University Press, New York 1979); Stephen Kocs, 'Explaining the Strategic Behaviour of States: 
International Law as a system structure” (1994) 38 International Studies Quarterly 535-56. 
The continuing legacy of apartheid-rule in the SADC is summed up in a speech of 28 
July 2004 to the joint Namibia Economic Society and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
breakfast meeting by Namibia’s Prime Minister - Theo-Ben Gurirab. In it he is 
unequivocal that the economic and social legacy of apartheid-rule in the SADC is 
enormously salient, dominant and resilient. Therefore, political freedom's foremost 
concern should be to dismantle that legacy and annihilate that resilience. BEE policies 
are the inevitable consequence of that situation.  
The past iniquities wrought upon our country and people were vicious acts of exclusion, 
selfishness and denial of the ideals of equality, democracy, rule of law and justice to the 
majority. Our shining Constitution and the policy of national reconciliation have enjoined all 
Namibians to turn our backs on that ugly past and to move on, straightening up the question 
mark and begin by declaring that we must unite and work together to make Namibia a land of 
peace, justice and prosperity for all. I must, however, add, as history has taught us, that to 
forgive is human, but to forget is out of the question! 
 
Freedom and independence brought Black Majority Rule in Southern Africa, brought by 
former Freedom Fighters and Ex-Prisoners of yesteryears. To tell the truth, this change has 
actually benefited the previously advantaged more than the previously oppressed, poor, needy, 
weak and disenfranchised majority. What is the problem with BEE today or ever? None! 
Black Economic Empowerment is in practical terms the flip side of Black Majority Rule. It is 
a development strategy to complete the unfinished business of decolonization and eradication 
of the past social deficit in order to level the national playing field in our pursuit of eradicating 
poverty and implementing socio-economic transformation programmes. 
 
I have noticed that IMF is rearing its ugly head by preaching the usual stuff, this time about 
BEE initiatives in Southern Africa. Its scare tactic is to broadcast a falsehood that BEE 
interventions in economic and financial sectors will scare off foreign investors. IMF’s so-
called Structural Adjustment Programme has created social dislocations in Africa and scared 
off foreign investors. We will continue to honour our promise to keep IMF out of Namibia, by 
ensuring macro-economic stability and reducing budget deficit.
8 
South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act No. 53 of 20039 legally 
initiated the process for ensuring government policy of targeting the legacy of 
economic inequality between whites and blacks. The Act seeks to enhance the number 
of black people that manage, own and control South Africa's economy.  The Act  
facilitates the work of the Department of Trade and Industry’s (DTI)  in this area by: 
 establishing a legislative framework for the promotion of BEE; 
 empowering the Minister to issue Codes of Good Practice and publishing Transformation  
Charters; 
 establishing the BEE Advisory Council; and 
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 making provision for matters connected therewith.10 
Within the region, South Africa appears to have taken the lead-role in this process by 
publishing in February 2007 a BEE Code of Good Practice.
11
 The code has now 
become a standard by which investments and enterprises are assessed for their 
compliance with BEE policy and legislation in South Africa. Institutional mechanisms 
have been established already for the monitoring and continual evaluation of BEE 
practice in the entire economy.   




 Although employment equity forms part of it, it does not merely aim to transfer wealth from
 white people to black people. At the core of the policy is the BEE scorecard, which measures
 companies’ empowerment progress in ownership, management, employment equity, staff 
 training and direct empowerment. 
 Private companies have to apply the codes if they want to do business with the government - 
 to tender for business, apply for licences and concessions, enter into public-private 
 partnerships, or buy state-owned assets. 
 Companies are also encouraged to apply the codes in their interactions with one another, as 
 preferential procurement will affect most private enterprises throughout the supply chain. 
 
Interim reports show that BEE’s effort to include the long-excluded black majority  
into the mainstream of economic life is paying healthy dividends. BEE is credited 
with pushing the country’s growth rate up by nearly five percentage points in 2005. It 
is credited with pushing up South Africa’s challenge of India as the preferred 
destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). It is also credited with enormously 
progressing the total return on equities traded on the JSE in 2005 to forty-seven 
percentage points. The National Empowerment Fund, (NEF) set up to provide capital 
for BEE transactions, is working on at least 135 deals worth in excess of R1-billion.
13
   
 
Nonetheless, at its third meeting held at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on 20 May 
2010, the Chair of South Africa’s Advisory Council BEE, President Jacob Zuma 
observed that although much progress had been made in advancing black economic 
empowerment more still needed to be done. He urged the Advisory Council to come 
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up with stronger action plans capable of accelerating change. “The Council would 
need to answer the question: ‘In the South African context, where many people were 
excluded for centuries, how do we level the playing field?’”14 
 
Zimbabwe, which had also suffered nearly a century of apartheid rule from 1890 to 
1980, has actively pursued BEE practice. Its Indigenization and Economic 
Empowerment Act No. 14 of 2007 was signed into law on April 17 2008. It requires 
all companies operating in Zimbabwe to arrange for fifty-one percent of their shares 
or interests therein to be owned by indigenous Zimbabweans.
15
 The Statutory 
Instrument No. 21 of 2010 titled Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations 
fleshes out those requirements and sets out specific action points to promote BEE. 
Section 4 of these regulations requires every business to notify the Zimbabwe 
government the extent of present and future compliance action on their part with 
indigenization legislation. 
 
Although not as sophisticated as South Africa’s BEE regulations that have scorecards 
for public procurement ratings,
16
 Zimbabwe’s indigenization policy and legislation 
derives from the same principle of substituting equality for inequality on racial lines 
in the economic and social structures of the State. In fact, Zimbabwe’s indigenization 
policy and legislation are consistent with the emergent BEE policies under 
consideration in Namibia and being practiced in South Africa, except that South 
Africa's are yet to impinge on land and mining rights to the extent that Zimbabwe's 
already have done. 
 
The apparent and growing success of BEE in South Africa, coupled with both its 
copying in Namibia and Zimbabwe – two other countries worst affected by apartheid-
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rule, and the acquiescence of non-participating SADC States is typical of custom
17
 - 
the process by which norms of CIL are formed under international law.
18
 This strongly 
recommends the view that SADC States may have inaugurated the CIL norm on BEE  
as a strategy for dealing with the legacy of the international crime of apartheid-rule.  
Whereas States can generally contract out of general CIL by adopting the Persistent 
Objector status throughout the formation of a particular norm,
19
 there appears to be no 
scope for geographically alien States to successfully involve themselves or impede the 
formation of local CIL that is limited to local and not international matters unless it is 
manifestly contrary to international human rights law. The International Court of 
Justice underlined this fact when it stated in the Asylum Case that: 
 
 The Court cannot therefore find that the Colombian Government has proved the existence of 
 such a custom. But even if it could be supposed that such a custom existed between certain 
 Latin-American States only, it could not be invoked against Peru which, far from having by its 
 attitude adhered to it, has, on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the 
 Montevideo Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule concerning t




Columbia had claimed that Peru had incurred international responsibility by allegedly 
breaching a rule of local CIL on the granting of asylum to fugitives. The Court 
required the Colombian government to “... prove that the rule invoked by it [was] in 
accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and 
that this usage [was] an expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum 
and a duty incumbent upon the territorial State;”21 and not whether other alien States 
regarded such a claim as valid under international law. While this formulation of 
custom's secondary rules of recognition is not without difficulty regarding creative 
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determinacy and certainty,
22
 rules of CIL have served international tribunals and their 
clients and continue to, so much so that that has become the theorist and not the 
practitioner's challenge. Frustrated by this disparity, some theorists have called for 




Commenting on the Organization of African Unity
24
 (OAU) and African Union's
25
 
(AU) combined slow generation of multilateral treaties in comparison to the UN or 
the WTO for instance, Maluwa
26
 observes that this should not be mistaken for a 
reluctance by either the AU or its predicessor, the OAU, to resort to this most obvious 
and direct method of lawmaking because “... all AU member States are also members 
of the UN and are, therefore, for the most part, parties to the UN sponsored 
multilateral treaties.” In this light African regional multilateral treaties often play a 
complementary rather than competing role with the universal UN processes, paying 
particular attention to the African situation. Similarly, because member States parties 
of the SADC are all member States parties of the AU the sub-regional treaties of the 
SADC, or of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and also the East 
African Community (EAC) complement rather than compete with those of the AU or 
UN above them. The authors of the UN Charter must have intended this through 
Chapter VIII measures of the Charter. Because law making treaties
27
 are intricately 
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twined with the process by which rules of CIL are established,
28
  treaty provisions are 
often used to codify customs that States already regard as binding against one another; 
and customs sometimes result from treaty provisions, it follows that regional and sub-
regional multilateral treaties have tremendous potential to contribute to international 
law-making.
29




 writes that the material sources of custom are very numerous and include 
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, opinions of legal 
advisers, official manuals on legal questions, executive decisions and practices, state 
legislation, international and national judicial decisions. Therefore, the adoption of 
BEE policy, legislative and administrative measures to implement it; the setting up of 
governmental departments responsible for implementing it; the creation of Advisory 
Councils that set strategies for accelerating and evaluating BEE progress; and the 
privileging of BEE as the centrepiece of national public procurement policy suffices 
as justification for the proposition that BEE has become a norm of regional CIL in 
SADC States. 
 
Moreover, the SADC’s ‘powerful and concerned’ States, namely South Africa, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe have in a very short time precipitated radical practice on the 
matter. This has met with the approval/acquiescence of other SADC States. Those 
States that achieved political independence from their colonizers in the 1960s under 
the United Nations decolonization programme appear to sympathise with their 
counterparts that only achieved political freedom more recently. 
 
In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
31
 the ICJ stated that passage of time is not 
itself a significant matter in the determination of the question whether State practice 
had crystallised into a new norm of CIL. “[E]ven without the passage of any 
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considerable period of time, a very widespread and representative participation … 
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interests were 
specifically affected”.32  It is arguable that South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe - the 
three post-liberation SADC States, worst affected by apartheid-rule, may have 
contributed to international law by inaugurating a new norm of regional CIL on BEE 
for the specific purpose of countering the economic and social legacy of apartheid-
rule on their territories. This development recommends the view that under general 
international law, transitional States may now have a right/duty to deliberately take 
redress measures without incurring responsibility in order to correct the unjust legacy 
of international crimes such as apartheid and even slavery. There is no shortage of 
justifications for this determination.  
 
Perhaps SADC States have an unrivalled claim to moral legitimacy to institute BEE 
policies. South Africa had remained under apartheid-rule until its first democratic 
elections of 1994, while Namibia had remained under apartheid-rule until its first 
black-majority-rule government led by SWAPO in 1990. Zimbabwe had remained 
under apartheid-rule until its first black-majority-rule government led by ZANU(PF) 
in 1980. The post-apartheid governments of these States must now substitute equality 
for inequality; and broad based inclusion for majority exclusion as their basic 
economic and social norm. This challenge alone is a sufficient enough moral 




 writes that “the duration and generality of a practice may take second place to 
the relative importance of the states precipitating the formation of a new customary 
rule in any field”. Maluwa34 writes that despite being the youngest member State 
party of the African Union and by inference of the SADC, South Africa has steadily 
assumed a leadership role on the African continent. Both the powerful and specially 
affected parties required to participate for the process of custom to be valid in the 
creation of a local CIL on BEE in the SADC, namely South Africa, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe have been involved. Their practice has either been approved or acquiesced 
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with by other Member States parties of the SADC. This recommends the view that 
BEE may already have become a norm of regional CIL in the SADC. 
 
I 
BIT dispute resolution dynamic, an incubator for anti-BEE practices? 
 
Yet an interesting counter-emergent practice is also making headway in the sub-
region. It is investors' resort to the dispute settlement mechanisms contained in BIT 
agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign investments.    
 
The proposition that foreign European nationals/investors could rely on dispute 
settlement agreements contained in BIT agreements for the promotion and protection 
of foreign investments to oppose SADC governments' efforts to redress economic and 
social inequality that is directly linked to apartheid-rule risks defaming the BIT 
framework for the promotion and protection of foreign investments as a tool for the 
maintenance of the immoral fruits of apartheid-rule. Such a proposition would 
undermine also the credibility of the UN system in its entirety because the UN has 
condemned apartheid-rule as a crime against humanity. In particular, it would 
challenge the UN’s commitment to: 
(i) The millennium development goals that champion economic and social 
development for the specific purpose of progressing the fight against 
poverty, hunger and disease everywhere in the world. 
(ii) The Human Security agenda which BEE appears more favourable to than the 
BIT empowerment of individuals from European States to challenge and 
foil SADC States effort to redress apartheid engineered economic and 
social inequality. 





Further, such a proposition would be contrary to the priorities of several UN 
mandates,
36
 including the ILO,
37
 the UNHCR Human Security Commission,
38
 and 
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  to name a few. Therefore, the concurrent development of BEE as a 
basic norm of SADC States for the countering of the economic and social legacy of 
apartheid rule on their territories for over half a century on the one hand; and the 
development of BITs for the regulation of investment disputes on the other is clearly a 
matter of legal curiosity. The two appear still to be temporally diametrically opposed 
in the SADC, at least in light of the emergent jurisprudence.  
 
The proposition that foreign nationals/investors could invoke dispute settlement 
mechanisms contained in BITs to compel SADC States to either abandon BEE 
policies altogether, or compensate them for non-commercial risks that they had 
suffered as a result of BEE practice appears to be unsustainable for a variety of 
reasons. 
 
Firstly, that proposition is oriented towards the perpetuation of the fruits of apartheid-
rule under the pretensions of the practice of the rule of law.
40
 The contradiction that 
arises is that while apartheid-rule has now been universally proscribed, by way of jus 
cogens – international law's most elite category of norms,41 its outcomes could remain 
protected in ways that could threaten peace and security in the SADC. This is because 
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of the prevalence in SADC States of salient manifestations of apartheid-rule 




Secondly, such a proposition would contravene one of the cardinal principles of 
international law so elegantly enunciated by Judge Huber in the Island of Palmers 
case,
43
 namely, that the exclusive ownership and control of a defined piece of the 
globe by a government is the strongest evidence of any claim to statehood - something 
that resort to dispute settlement mechanisms contained in BITs for the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments particularly in relation to counter-claims of title to 
land makes a strong case against. 
 
Emergent practice of assigning SADC counter property claims to the ICSID strongly 
challenges this cardinal principle of Public International Law. Foreign 
nationals/investors, and not States, could terrorise SADC States with all manner of 
legal suits for what they perceived to be BEE inspired non-commercial risks to their 
enterprises. The Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others v. Republic of 
Zimbabwe (2009)
44
 and Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of 
South Africa (2010)
45
 cases justify this claim. 
 
However, paragraph 10 of General Comment No. 18 which deals with the obligation 
to ensure equal treatment of persons and non-discrimination appears to countenance 
BEE policies: 
The Committee also wishes to point out that the principle of equality sometimes requires 
States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which 
cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. For example, in a State 
where the general conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair their 
enjoyment of human rights, the State should take specific action to correct those conditions. 
Such action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population concerned certain 
preferential treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest of the population. 
However, as long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of 
legitimate differentiation under the Covenant.
46 
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Therefore, the apparent difficulty created by resort to BIT dispute settlement 
mechanisms in an effort to maintain property claims that are the legitimate target of 
BEE practice recommends the view that SADC States’ may not be ready yet to 
participate in BITs. This is because the object and purpose of BITs is to protect the 
interests of participating States. Therefore, whatever the status of BEE policy in 
SADC States, BIT dispute settlement agreements have every possibility to trump it. 
SADC States must be mindful of this fact before they commit themselves to any such 
agreements with anyone. 
 
BITs commonly confer on nationals of participating States the legal capacity to bring 
the host State before international tribunals to answer claims of non-commercial risks 
that their enterprises might have suffered in the host State. This scenario is more 
troubling in cases where the individual concerned had always been a citizen of the 
same SADC State that they were now invoking their genealogical links against in 




 has shown how inseparable national interest is, in the conduct of States, 
even when crafting laws. 
One frequently encounters the view that international law is made by the powerful few to 
support their particular interests. … … Some have elevated this view to a doctrine, 
questioning whether one may meaningfully speak of international norms, of their observance 
or violation. … There are reasons why nations make law and conclude agreements, and why 
they make particular law; like in many national societies, international law results from the 
complex interplay of varied forces in international politics. ….  …. – international law is 
observed by nations as national policy, shared with other nations, in support of an orderly 
society. 
 
It is in this role as international policy maker that international law ought to be 
scrutinised for its potential to be abused by the more powerful nations against the 
weaker nations of the SADC. The probability that the more powerful States could be 
concluding BITs with dispute settlement mechanisms that empower their nationals to 
effectively frustrate host SADC States’ effort to implement a basic norm of (BEE) is a 
case in point. Even though SADC nationals could in theory bring similar claims 
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against a participating European State, the likelihood of that happening is extremely 
remote.   
 
Generally, international law’s difficulty in this lies in that while it may have 
proscribed apartheid-rule as a crime against humanity, States are still able through 
BITs to ensure that their nationals retain and milk the fruits of apartheid-rule contrary 
to the political, social and economic aspirations of the post-apartheid States; and 
contrary also to the reasoning of the UN Human Rights Committee which has 
approved initiatives to correct the effects of practices such as apartheid-rule.
48
  The 
economic and social outcomes of apartheid are not resident in some remote museums 
of SADC States, accessible only by a boat trip that most cannot afford. No! They are 
salient and apparent wherever one looks, wherever one may happen to be in those 
post-apartheid SADC States. 
 
At the turn of the millennium were already in existence over ten thousand BITs. 
UNCTAD writes that the number of BITs concluded continues to rise. More than two-
thirds of the 1,513 treaties signed by the end of 1997 came into existence in the 1990s. 
In 1997 alone, 153 BITs were concluded - approximately one every two-and-a-half 
days.
49
 By 2002 some 2,181 BITs had been concluded.  By 2003, there were 2,265 
BITs in existence and involving 176 States.
50
  “Most significantly, the number of BITs 
concluded between developing countries themselves, and between these countries and 
economies in transition, had also risen substantially during the 1990s. In 1997 alone, 
over a quarter (27 per cent) of the treaties concluded were between developing 
countries.”51 







Developed countries 1170 26 45 
Developing countries 1745 150 12 
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Africa 533 53 10 
Latin America and the Caribbean 413 40 10 
Asia and the Pacific 1003 57 18 
CEE 716 19 38 
Source: UNCTAD, BITs databases
52
 
This article focuses on the apparent tensions that have arisen from affected SADC 
States’ premature participation in BITs for the promotion and protection foreign 
investment. Unless these States ensure a completely different approach to dispute 
settlement, i.e. one that is not opposed to but facilitatory of BEE practice, by 
participating in standard BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments 
they risk incoherency because they have already made BEE their foremost concern in 
the post-apartheid social and economic reconstruction agenda. 
 
The recent case of Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South 
Africa
53
 case demonstrates clearly the incoherency that can result when SADC States’ 
agree BITs for the promotion and protection of investment without due diligence. The 
claimants, several Italian citizens and Luxembourg corporations held interests in 
South African granite quarrying companies. They claimed that the implementation of 
South Africa’s new BEE legislation, namely, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act of 2002 (MPRDA) and its administrative procedures set forth in the 
Mining Charter had effectively extinguished their mineral rights under the “old order 
mineral law” without providing adequate compensation.54 
 
It had been argued on behalf of the Claimants that the MPRDA had extinguished 
“certain putative old order mineral rights” that they allegedly held contrary to 
common Article 5 of the South Africa and Italy BIT on the one hand, and the South 
Africa and Luxembourg BIT on the other.
55
  The South African government had 
insisted however that the Claimants could not show that their investments under the 
relevant BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments were property 
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owned “in a legally relevant sense under the law governing the common law mineral 
rights, i.e. South African Law,”56 because “South African law did not grant the 
Claimants ownership or anything akin to it over the common law mineral rights”.57 
This is sovereignty argument insists upon the competence of the State to determine 
the laws that govern its territory and as far as South Africa was concerned, its law had 
not made it possible for common law mineral rights to transfer from those to whom 
such rights could be vested in, namely, the Operating Companies, or more commonly 
their lessors, to become investors’ property under the relevant BITs for the promotion 




Further, it had been argued on behalf of the Claimants that the combined effect of 
MPRDA legislation and the administrative requirements of the Mining Charter of 13 
August 2004 had imposed upon the claimants “compulsory equity divestiture 
requirements with respect to the Claimants’ shares in the Operating Companies”, 
contrary to common Article 5 to the relevant BITs for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments. 
 
The measures complained about in this case are traceable to BEE efforts to increase 
the participation of historically disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) in the 
ownership of mining assets. They had come about as a result of consultations between 
the South African Government, the South African Chamber of Mines, the National 
Union of Mineworkers, and the South African Mineral development Association.
59
 
The measures require companies to achieve at least twenty-six per cent HDSA 
ownership of mining assets by 2014,
60
 and to publish their equity employment plans 
directed at achieving a baseline of at least forty per cent HDSA participation in 
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It had been argued also on behalf of the Claimants that the implementation of the 
MPRDA and Mining Charter provisions had breached “certain due process 
obligations” provided for under Article 5(9) of the Italy BIT.62 Further, Articles 5(1) 




 The expropriation must be for public purposes or in the international interest (Italy BIT) or for 
a public purpose related to the internal needs of the country (Luxembourg BIT. 
 The expropriation must be on a non-discriminatory basis. 
 The host State must pay immediate, full and effective compensation (Italy BIT) or prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation (Luxembourg BIT). 
 The expropriation must be undertaken under due process of law (Luxembourg BIT). 
 
Clearly, the dispute settlement mechanisms contained in these investment BITs for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments is entirely consistent with the object 
and purpose of promoting and protecting foreign investment. At the core of their 
design is the dislocation of national strategies that may threaten the purely capital 
interests of the foreign investor. This makes it extremely unlikely that BITs for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments would be designed to facilitate the 
object and purpose of the MPRDA and Mining Charter regime for ensuring BEE. The 
decision in this case had enormous ramifications for the entire BEE mission in one of 




 reports that developing countries typically seek BIT frameworks that 
promote capital and technological flow to their territories in order to facilitate 
economic growth and social development. Meanwhile, sending States are interested in 
creating legal frameworks that will protect foreign investments from non-commercial 
risks in host States, including the possible nationalization of investments. BITs appear 
to be pro-foreign investments in that their main driver, the dispute resolution 
mechanism requires disputes to be settled using international and not national law, 
and international arbitration tribunals and not national courts. This protects the 
investors from possible changes to national law after the investment has already 
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occurred. Host States can change their national laws at any point in the life of such 




In the case of Zimbabwe, many foreign investments had occurred after its 
Independence from Britain on 18 April 1980. Some had occurred on privately secured 
farms or commercial interests that were linked in some way to commercial farm 
holdings. Such investments have dealt with no other government except President 
Mugabe’s own post-apartheid government. They have contributed taxes and other 
duties to that government. They are not in any way directly or indirectly linked to 
apartheid-rule. In a sense they could be regarded as proactive facilitators of 
Zimbabwe’s post-independence economic development agenda. However, application 
of the constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act No. 17, 2005 which empowered the 
Zimbabwe government to confiscate commercial farmland without compensation 




Moreover, where the sending State has previously concluded a BIT agreement for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments with the Zimbabwe government, the 
dispute settlement standards contained therein may prove to be immune to the new 
land acquisition legislation - a point conceded by the Zimbabwe Ministry of Foreign 





Emergent practice of seeking use BIT dispute settlement procedures to resolve SADC 
counter claims to property has enormous potential to result in discriminatory 
treatment. This is because while foreign nationals could sue for any non-commercial 
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risks that they had experienced through the implementation of BEE regulatory 
requirements, nationals of the particular host SADC State would have no such 
recourse even if they had suffered similar risks. 
 
Other foreign nationals whose governments had not concluded similar BIT 
agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign investments with SADC 
States could still sue for non-commercial risks that they had encountered if both their 
home State and the host SADC State happened to be parties to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) agreement. The most favoured nation (MFN) principle requires 
that States Parties should extend to other WTO States Parties, the same treatment that 
they would accord to goods and services from their most favoured nation.
68
 This 
applies even to MFN treatment premised on a BIT agreement for the promotion and 




This scenario raises the real prospect that the SADC land issue could soon become a 
matter of further litigation at the WTO’s Dispute Settlement body providing that the 
MFN principle could be invoked.
70
 The question is whether a State as impoverished 
as present day Zimbabwe could pay its way through the litigation processes and the 
awards that are steeply mounting against it over its BEE inspired economic reform 
programmes
71
 that foreign nationals may challenge by virtue of the existence of a BIT 
for the promotion and protection of foreign investments between Zimbabwe and their 
home States. 
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In terms of international law’s prohibition against unequal treatment,72 Zimbabwean 
nationals whose farms had been confiscated by their own government under the land 
acquisition programme would be the only ones with nowhere to go for legal redress as 
they would have neither BIT agreement dispute settlement mechanisms to invoke 
against their own State, nor MFN based litigation possibilities. The ouster clauses 
contained in BEE legislation often restrict national courts from receiving claims that 
are consequent upon the application of BEE policies. In Commercial Farmers Union 
and Others v The Minister of Lands and Rural resettlement and Others (Zimbabwe) 
(2010), the Supreme Court held that former owners and/or occupiers whose land had 
been acquired by the acquiring authority in terms of section 16 B (2)(a) of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe could not challenge the legality of such acquisition in a 
Court of Law. This is because the jurisdiction of the Courts has been ousted by section 
16 B (3)(a) of the Constitution.73 The Court ruled further that decisions of the SADC 
Tribunal were ‘at best persuasive but certainly not binding’ because the SADC  
Tribunal had not been transformed into Zimbabwean law. Consequently its findings 
had no legal status in Zimbabwe. Consequently, the Supreme Court's decisions were 
final on the matter.   
 
 It is arguable that the UN’s failure to include opposable indigenous land claim rights 
and apartheid-engineered land claim rights in its decolonization, reconstruction and 
development plans for SADC States has been the Organization’s single biggest 
omission in its peace building effort in the sub-region. Having universally proscribed 
the practice of apartheid by way of jus cogens, the UN could and should have done 
better than to merely hope that the land issue that most highlighted the 
unconscionability of the practice of apartheid-rule in the sub-region would simply 
melt away.   
 
II 
SADC Land Relations 
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 SADC land issues evoke emotive, counter-claims to property that are traceable to the 
sequence of colonization or occupation of native indigenous populations by European 
elements in the late nineteenth century; liberation from colonial rule or occupation; 
and the introduction of a new and opposable system of land ownership and use by 
majority-rule-governments starting in the twenty-first century. 
 
 In the case of Zimbabwe a comprehensive and thorough study of the country’s soils 
and climate had preceded classification of the nation’s land according to its 
agricultural potential
74
 before it was designated private white commercial farmland, 
black tribal trust land area, or national trust land. 
 
Zone one comprises the most fertile regions of the country with the most potential for 
agricultural production while zone five comprises semi-desert soils with the least 
potential for agricultural production. As far as possible, land allocation proceeded on 
agro-ecological values, with privately owned commercial zones for white farmers 
situated in the fertile, high rainfall areas with the greatest agricultural potential (Zones 
I and II) while black peasants’ Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) were situated in infertile, 
low rainfall areas with the least agricultural potential. 
 
This set up had been achieved by forcible evacuation of natives from their lands, a 
form of confiscation. Confiscation has been helpfully defined as the capricious taking 
of property by the rulers of the State for personal gain; while expropriation refers to 
the assumption of ownership rights by the State for either an economic or public 
purpose.
75
 Throughout this process, legislative force had been the critical tool. This is 
probably the reason why the Mugabe regime has adopted the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, 2005, which empowers the government to 
acquire commercial farms without compensation, just as the Southern Rhodesia 
                         
74
  Ben Chigara, ‘From Oral to Recorded Governance: Reconstructing Title to Real Property in 
21
st
 Century Zimbabwe’ (2001) 30 Common Law World Review 36, 42. 
75
  See also Dunia Zongwe, ‘The contribution of Campbell v Zimbabwe to the foreign 
investment law on expropriations’ 2 Namibia Law Journal 31, 34. 
apartheid laws had authorised successive colonial administrations to confiscate land 
previously held by the native indigenous population without compensation.
76
   
 
Those laws had also prohibited Africans from holding land in European Areas. The 
native blacks could purchase land in the designated Native Area, under certain 
conditions. The designated Native Areas became known as the Native Purchase Areas, 
a title not embodied in the Legislation until the 1950 amendment to the Land 
Apportionment Act. 
 
The Land Apportionment Act (1930) had reserved thirty percent of all agricultural 
land for the 1.1 million Africans and fifty-one percent of all agricultural land for the 
50,000 whites.
77
 The Land Husbandry Act (1951) had enforced private ownership of 





By the application of these legislative acts, natives lost their lands, without 
compensation and were forced mostly into regions with the least agricultural potential 
and least favourable rainfall. Commentators
79
 are united that expropriations are the 
severest form of interference with property. Nonetheless, the doctrine of State 
sovereignty guarantees States the right to expropriate under the principle of eminent 
domain.
80
 The investor could always mitigate against the political, non commercial 
risk to their investment in the host State by taking insurance guarantees from either 
the national investment insurance agencies or from the World Bank’s Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
81
 Moreover, the right of States to expropriate 
is fettered by investment law’s requirement that the expropriation must not be 
discriminatory. Rather it must serve an economic or public purpose and the 
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expropriating State must comply with its duty under international law to compensate 
victims of any such expropriation(s).
82
 Zongwe writes that: “When compensation 
follows a taking by the State, expropriations or nationalisations [across-the-board 
takings by the State, targeted at scaling back or annihilating foreign investment in the 
economy] amount to forced sales. When, on the other hand, no compensation is paid 
for expropriations or nationalisations, the taking amounts to a confiscation…”83 I 
submit that upon colonisation native black populations of the SADC had suffered 
confiscation of their lands without the benefit of the latter emergent investment laws 
or national or international insurance regimes. 
 
The result was that by 1960 more than 25,000 black families were squatting in the 
Purchase Areas on a “communal basis”. The Advisory Committee of the Southern 
Rhodesia Government (1962) had reported that: “This set acute problems of 
satisfactory re-settlement of the squatters and the finding of sufficient suitable land for 
the more than 3,000 applicants…”.84 
 
By 1976, a total of four and a half million Africans had been left to crowd in the 
infertile, drought prone Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs).
85
 These circumstances had 
persisted well into post-apartheid Zimbabwe. The same pattern of expropriation 
without compensation and the reduction of the indigenous populations into wage 
earners on European enterprises had been replicated also in South Africa and 
Namibia.
86
 The achievements of this practice have remained largely unaltered to this 
day.  These are the facts that have precipitated the land issues of the SADC. 
 
At his inauguration as South Africa’s third President on 9 May 2009 Jacob Zuma 
declared that faster land reform would be one of his new administration’s top five 
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priorities.
87
  This is because of the existence of an indisputable link between the 
constitutionalization of SADC land issues and the emergent BEE norm. 
 
(a) Reverse legislation: 
In 1992 the Mugabe regime began the long process of adopting BEE inspired counter-
apartheid measures for the purpose of tackling inequality of opportunity along racial 
lines. The Land Acquisition Act (1992) was adopted for the purpose of facilitating the 
redistribution of under-utilised commercial farmland. 
 
Sections 5 and 8 of the Act established the acquisition procedures. Under section 5 
acquisitions would be initiated by the issuance of a preliminary notice by the Ministry 
of Lands and Agriculture against the targeted property. From that point onwards the 
proprietor would no longer be entitled to dispose of the land without the permission of 
the Acquiring Authority. The notices were initially intended to have a two-year life 
span unless otherwise withdrawn or otherwise the land was acquired under section 8 
of the Act. 
 
Section 8 of the Act, authorises the Acquiring Authority to issue an Acquisition of Land 
Order divesting the previous owner of all proprietary interest. However, Section 7 of the 
Act required such orders to be authorized by the Administrative Court. Applications for 
confirmation launched by the Acquiring Authority simply overwhelmed the 
Administrative Court and it became impossible to confirm all such cases. Therefore, the 
Act was amended in 2000 and the two year limit was rescinded. Notwithstanding, the 
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe had declared the 2000 amendment unconstitutional and 
imposed a one-year limit on the effectiveness of Section 5 notices. In 2001, a 
differently constituted Supreme Court had removed the one year limitation on the 
operation of section 5 notices.
88
Section 16 of the 2000 Act requires the Acquiring 
Authority to pay “fair compensation” to the “owner of any agricultural land required 
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for resettlement purposes and to any other person whose right or interest in land has 
been acquired in terms of this Act.”89 
 
The Zimbabwe government’s land acquisition legislative process had culminated in 
the adoption of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.17) Act, 2005 that 
empowers the government to acquire commercial farms without compensation. 
Moreover, the government had proposed a new Constitution that inter alia mandated 
acquisition of land without compensation. That attempt had been defeated at a 
referendum in 2000. It is not clear whether it was the land or other issues in that 
proposal; or poor campaign strategies or timing or other matters that caused its 
rejection at the referendum. Nonetheless, the constitutionality of this Act was 
challenged before the Supreme Court and was upheld, but before the SADC Tribunal 
it was found to be inconsistent with fundamental provisions of the SADC Treaty on 
non-discrimination. 
 
Both the apartheid-rule land expropriation laws and the Mugabe post apartheid-rule 
land acquisition laws regard land ownership and use as a constitutional matter. The 
Zimbabwe government has always contended that the measures it had taken to 
deprive Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others
90
 of their properties had been 





Moreover, government had also adopted in June 2001 the Rural Law Occupiers 
(Protection from Eviction) Act which entitles people squatting on commercial 
farmland from eviction.
92
 If previous land reform legislation had left anyone in any 
doubt about the trumping of previous land titles, this legislation effectively served to 
nullify prior land rights and instituted a new land use regime based upon the historical 
constitutional nature of land allocation and use in Zimbabwe. 
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Mugabe has persistently argued that: “The resettlement programme, as planned, must 
never be allowed to fail nor must it be hampered by any extraneous factors or 
considerations. The communal people, who are far too land-hungry to remain in their 
present state, should never be denied the land they stand in need of by the antics of a 
group of selfish settlers. The land is the people’s heritage.”93 In his address to his 
ZANU (PF) party, he put it beyond doubt that land reform had become the ultimate 
test of genuine majority-rule governance in the post-apartheid SADC. 
 
What is clear from the foregoing discussion is that both the post-apartheid majority-
rule government and the preceding minority-rule apartheid administrations share the 
view that Southern Rhodesia/Rhodesia/Zimbabwe’s land issues are a constitutional 
matter to be regulated and determined only by constitutional imperatives that defer to 
no other value than sovereign authority. Mugabe has strenuously argued that he has 
always been motivated by values of fairness and justice. For this reason he has 
invoked the constitutional law of the land to help undo previous unfairness and 
injustices with the same brute force that had helped create them, namely laws that 
recognise and defer to no other interest, i.e. constitutional laws. 
 
Therefore BIT agreements that seek to insulate investments of foreign nationals from 
BEE practice in the SADC risk portraying themselves as unrepentant imperialists 
particularly in the perception of SADC States. The petroleum industry has embraced 
BEE in their dealings with South Africa by adopting a Black Economic 
Empowerment Charter.
94
 The Charter which recites provisions on equality from the 
Constitution of South Africa and the South African Bill of Rights provides a 
framework for the industry to “progress the empowerment of historically 
disadvantaged South Africans in the liquid fuels industry”.95 Consequently, Shell now 
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describes itself on its website as: “A Fully Qualified Black Economic Empowerment 
Company”.96 
 
However, BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments generally 
regard resort to the dispute settlement process in international tribunals as the only 
way of addressing non-commercial risks that foreign nationals may encounter as a 
consequence of BEE policy in the SADC. Thus, some have invoked against President 
Mugabe’s BEE inspired land acquisition programme, litigation that prays both 
regional and international tribunals for declarations of unjust and illegal appropriation 
of property; and discrimination on account of their race. 
 
The adoption of the UDHR is commonly described as mankind’s finest moment.97 But 
it would be wrong to assume that such a moment had extinguished all of the legacies 
of mankind’s previous worst experiences, including slavery, apartheid, wars of 
aggression and genocidal acts. The fact is that it did not. If anything, it merely pointed 
to the futility of such vices in social ordering processes and sought to point mankind 
in the direction of a much higher and nobler morality, premised on the recognition, 
promotion and protection of the inherent dignity of all people all the time. 
 
They differ only in that land acquisition laws of the Mugabe regime regard titles 
created under apartheid as fruits of apartheid that must be burried just like the system 
of apartheid that had created them. In fact they regard them as evidence that apartheid 
still survives in their midst, while the litigants wonder whether the Mugabe regime is 
aware at all that it is bound by twenty-first century values and not the nineteenth 
century values that created the land issue. 
 
b) Apartheid Legislation v the emergent post-apartheid reverse Land Acquisition 
Legislation: A complex or simple justiciable matter? 
The foregoing discussion shows that the SADC land issues have resulted from 
application of opposing constitutional laws - one set developed during minority 
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apartheid-rule government and another that is developing in the post-apartheid 
majority-rule era. The purpose of the latter is to correct the foremost injustice of 
apartheid-rule in SADC States, namely, inequitable land distribution. 
 
Constitutional laws are the basic laws from which all other laws, conventions, 
procedures and practices of legal systems derive their validity. Resort to use of 
constitutional laws to transform (during apartheid-rule) and re-transform (in the post-
apartheid-era), the demographic distribution of land allocation in the SADC suggests 
both a recognition and an admission that ultimately it is the law that should order 
behaviour through a system of rules. 
 
Nonetheless, concerns to invoke the law absent justice appears in both cases to have 
engineered the land issues. It is difficult to free the concept of law from the idea of 
justice. This is partly because: 
… both are constantly confused in non-scientific political thought as well as in general speech, 
and because this confusion corresponds to the ideological tendency to make positive law 
appear as just. If  law and justice are identified, if only a just order is called law, a social order 
which is presented as law is – at the same time – presented as just; and that means it is morally 
justified. The tendency to identify law and justice is the tendency to justify a given social 
order.
 98
   
 
Invocation of the rule of law by foreign nationals of sending European States that 
results in constraining BEE policy and practice appears to be premised on what 
Kelsen
99
 has described as the non-scientific tendency to equate law with justice 
because of the natural assumption that positive laws should be just. 
 
But while a pure theory of law should not oppose the requirement of just law, it is not 
its function to state what the essential element of justice consists in. Consequently, it 
is itself incompetent to determine whether a law is just or unjust. Kelsen writes that: 
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“A pure theory of law – a science – cannot answer this question because this question 
cannot be answered scientifically at all.”100 
 
Consequently, by focusing on the law, both apartheid and post-apartheid legislators of 
the SADC appear to have fooled themselves into a conundrum. By both sets of land 
laws, they have penalized themselves into an argument that now requires their focus 
to be shifted from the law to the question of justice. Or perhaps what they have both 
achieved through their non-scientific tendencies to equate law with justice is to 
promote what are essentially unsustainable plans. Their non-scientific tendency is 
facilitated perhaps by the illusion that the courts of justice are the law courts. It is the 
law that has been assigned with the task of upholding justice.  Lucas writes that: 
 
It is a very serious criticism indeed of a legal official that he has acted unjustly, or of a law or 
legal system that it is unjust. … Often we draw a contrast between the positive law, which can 
indeed be unjust while still remaining valid, and the law of nature which perfectly exemplifies 
our ideal of justice. …. Justice cannot be defined as what the law lays down: there are many 
uses of the word ‘just’ which cannot be explicated in terms of law – an examiner’s mark, for 
example – and the fact that laws often are said to be unjust is further evidence against the 
adequacy of any such definition.
101 
 
If this appraisal of the circumstances regarding land acquisition legislation in both the 
apartheid-rule and the post apartheid-rule eras in SADC States is correct, then there is 
a case for saying that particularly in the apartheid-rule era, the positive constitutional 
laws enacted to order land allocation were unjust because they undermined social 
happiness.
102
 The effect of those laws is credited with manifesting the inhumanity of 
apartheid-rule and inspiring black nationalists to wage armed liberation struggles 
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According to Lucas, justice is concerned with not doing people down and “… a 
person is being done down if his interests are being damaged. … [I]njustice is done as 
much if a man’s rights are overridden as if his interests are damaged”.104 
 
Apartheid-rule policies had expropriated native indigenous populations of their lands 
without compensation, and forced them to become wage earners for settler white 
commercial enterprises, trumping native Africans’ interest in land – doing them 
down.
105
 The same could be said of the Mugabe regime’s Land Acquisition 
Legislation which regards the property rights of commercial farmers as at an end. 
 
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that the SADC land issues are constitutional 
matters. They are a result of colonial conquest, confiscation of native lands for almost 
a century, and attempts by black majority-rule governments to correct colonial 
injustices. Any attempt to invoke rule of law arguments to insist on the retention of 
the economic and social structures established under apartheid-rule appear misplaced. 
Apartheid-rule has been proscribed by the UN in the strongest terms possible, namely 
though a norm of jus cogens.
106
  It would also undermine the human sacrifices made 
to liberate these SADC States from apartheid-rule and serve to emasculate hard won 
political independence. 
 
The question that remains is whether the new strategy of invoking international 
tribunals such as the Washington D.C. based ICSID
107
 and the Windhoek based 
SADC Tribunal
108
 to settle disputed land rights is sustainable.  
 
III 
ICSID Arbitration of the SADC land issue 
Franck
109
 writes that investment treaty arbitration has a dirty little secret that is daily 
becoming less, and less secret - namely, that different tribunals reach different 
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outcomes under similar treaty provisions and similar factual circumstances. This 
raises the question of why sovereign nations demonstrably continue to prefer such an 
inconsistent, unpredictable, incoherent dispute settlement procedure which costs 
billions in investor claims each year. It becomes even more curious when one 
considers three factors. 
 
Firstly, in what has been described as a dramatic change in so short a period of time, 
the shift from using CIL standards on the regulation of foreign investments to the BIT 
framework for the promotion and protection of foreign investments represents a 
substantial feat of international law-making.
110
 The first BIT had been signed between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan on 25 November, 1959. The first BIT 
to be ratified had been signed by the Dominican Republic and the Federal Republic of 
Germany.
111
 Switzerland had also been very quick to embrace the BIT practice. By 
the late 1960s European nations had generally fully embraced the practice. By 1977 





The US BIT programme had been launched in 1981 and has since concluded over 50 
such agreements with developing countries and one other with Canada. The Canada 





Japan has concluded at least a dozen BITs with developing countries. The result is that 
the international legal framework regulating foreign investment comprises a dense 
network of international investment agreements that are supplemented by general 
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rules of international law. Newcombe and Paradell write that international investment 
agreements are now “the primary public international law instruments governing the 
promotion and protection of foreign investment”.114 
 
The popularity of BITs among developing countries is most remarkable, particularly 
when one considers that the BIT framework imposes obligations that exceed those of 
the Hull rule that required “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” in the event 
of nationalization or appropriation of foreign investments – non-commercial risks to 
foreign investments. For instance, Article 6(c) of the Agreement on Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments concluded on 11 December 1996 between 
the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of the Netherlands requires ‘just 
compensation’ which means ‘the genuine value of the investments affected,’ to be 
provided to the investors ‘without delay, to the country designated by the claimants 
concerned and in the currency of which the claimants are nationals’. Genuine value 
may be taken to mean ‘the net asset value thereof as certified by an independent firm 
of auditors’. 
 
Even if the view were taken that its predecessor, the Hull Rule had been doomed to 
fail anyway because of its inefficiency, the BIT framework is amazingly efficient 
especially at ensuring full protection of investor interests, even to the extent of 
challenging the sovereignty of host States. The Hull rule was infused with counter-
business uncertainties. For instance, it failed to specify procedural guidelines on such 
crucial issues as how to determine the level of compensation, and how any such 
compensation could be enforced, and by what laws. 
 
The emergent BIT framework provides for no such uncertainties, pointing to 
applicable laws, forum of dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with arbitral awards in the event of a dispute between the Parties. Franck 
writes that BITs entitle investors to choose where they will bring their claims. 
 
In what amounts to a sophisticated forum of choice clause, some treaties require investors to 
choose between litigating their treaty claims in national courts and arbitrating their investment 
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claims before an arbitral panel in a neutral forum, such as the ICSID, the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or an ad hoc tribunal organized under the UNCITRAL rules. 
Other treaties require investors to arbitrate their claims, but let the investors choose the 




In Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others,
116
 applicable Zimbabwe law had 
allowed only for compensation for the fixed improvements on or to the land 
expropriated.
117
 The claimants insisted on the ‘full compensation’ standard referred to 
in Article 9(1) of the BIT Agreement of 11 December 1996 between Zimbabwe and 
the Netherlands as the minimum standard of treatment. 
 
The tribunal held that: “In any event, it is on the basis of the applicable rules of 
International Law that in conformity with Article 9(3) of the BIT, the tribunal must 
decide ….. In other words, ultimately international law, not the domestic law of 
Zimbabwe, must determine …”118 
 
According to the Tribunal, where BITs are at issue general international law is 
invoked when it conforms to the applicable standard contained in the BIT. Therefore, 
it could be said that the emergent BIT framework is superior to general international 
law, and is capable through the emergent general state practice, to revise or transform 
existing rules of customary international law
119
 and in some cases to displace relevant 




Newcombe and Paradell have found that while actual texts of BITs concluded 
between different States may differ in some important aspects, they are remarkably 
similar in their structures and content. Most of them “combine similar (sometimes 
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identical) treaty-based standards of promotion and protection for foreign investment 
with an investor-state arbitration mechanism that allows foreign investors to enforce 
these standards against host States”.121 
 
Moreover, investment law empowers individuals/investors to sue their host nation 
under a treaty concluded between with their home State, a position that substantially 
alters the Public International Law doctrine of State immunity
122 
 because an injury to 
a foreign national is then equated to an injury to his/her State, and the 
individual/investor is authorised to claim reparation from the host State.
 
Delaume 
writes that the overwhelming weight of jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, treaty and 
provisions of the European Immunity Convention (1972), and Statutory enactments 
such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (1976) and the State Immunity Act 
(1978), as well as the pronouncements of domestic Courts “... all concur that a State 
party to an arbitration agreement is precluded from asserting its immunity in order to 
frustrate the purpose of the agreement”.123 Moreover, international law is unequivocal 
that arbitration proceedings against the host State can proceed unilaterally if a State 
that has assented to submission to arbitration (as dispute settlement mechanisms of 
BIT agreements for the promotion and protection of investment agreements between 





In Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and Others
125
 the Claimants, were Dutch 
nationals that had direct or indirect investments in large commercial farms in 
Zimbabwe. They claimed that implementation of the BEE inspired Zimbabwe land 
acquisition programme had deprived them of their investments in violation of the 
standards set forth in Article 6 of the BIT for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments concluded between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of 
Netherlands on 11 December 1996. 
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 The Zimbabwe government had argued inter alia that the Claimants had still not been 
compensated for the appropriations against their properties because they had failed to 
engage valuation and certification procedures required under the relevant Zimbabwe 
procedures for processing compensation claims.
126
 The Tribunal held that there was 
no obligation on the Dutch claimants to exhaust local remedies before going to 
arbitration.
127
 The responsibilities attaching to the parties were therefore beyond the 
dictates of Zimbabwe’s laws and were to be found in the BIT agreement itself and 
general international law that conformed to the BIT requirements. 
 
Consequently, BIT law could be said to be neither host, nor sending State national law 
because it is neither generally applicable nor does it depend on State institutions for 
its application. It is a species of law that regulates conduct of particular individuals 
and legal entities and their host States regardless of the requirements of the host 
State's own laws. When disputes arise, they are settled by an independent tribunal 
usually sitting in a neutral territory and comprised of foreign experts. In some cases 
arbitration panels may invoke municipal law of the seat of arbitration – lex loci 
arbitri, to govern procedural matters in order to facilitate the enforcement of the 
award. The arbitration panel in BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd. V Libyan Arab 
Republic
128
 stated that by providing  for arbitration as an exclusive mechanism for 
resolving contractual disputes the parties must be presumed to have intended to create 
an effective remedy. Even if one of them is a State, “The effectiveness of an arbitral 
award that lacks nationality – which it may if the law of the arbitrator is international 
law – generally is smaller than that of an award founded on the procedural law of a 




This dynamic of dispute settlement that is common to SADC/European BITs for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments has the effect of elevating 
individuals/investors to a status where they can exercise against their host State 
                         
126
  Judgment of 22 April 2009 para.100. 
127
  Ibid. 
128
 53 ILR 297 (1979) 
129
 Ibid. p.309. 
functions previously reserved only for States. Investors may initiate on neutral 
territory, proceedings against their host State. In this sense, and in some cases the BIT 
framework for the promotion and protection of foreign investments invests in the 
investors, new competencies that they probably lack at home, i.e., to sue his own State 
in a neutral country without the requirement of prior exhaustion of local remedies.
130
  
This is because BIT agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments habitually preclude application of host States’ own national laws and their 
own Courts. This begs the question of why developing States that fought so hard to 
get rid of the Hull rule only managed to replace it with a framework that appears to 
weaken them against foreign investors by ascribing to them legal capacities equal to 
themselves as States. This may be taken to reflect a lack of due-diligence on the part 
of developing States.  
 
Further, the BIT framework for the promotion and protection of foreign investments 
appears to disassemble the collective advantage that developing States had under the 
Hull rule regarding the trading of their resources with the developed world by pitting 
them in competition one against the other for Western FDI. Guzman writes that, 
“relative to other potential hosts, developing countries as a group are likely to benefit 
from forcing investors to enter contracts with host countries that cannot be enforced in 
an international forum, thereby giving the host a much greater ability to extract value 
from the investment”.131 
 
Thirdly, when disputes arise regarding BITs for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments concluded between developed and developing States, it is 
investors from developed nations that are likely to be the applicants, and developing 
States the respondents. The sum effect of these factors is likely to be that the overall 
welfare of developing States is diminished and not enhanced. This begs the question 
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why developing States and SADC States in particular appear to be so keen about the 
BIT framework for the regulation of foreign investments. 
 
Writers observe that BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments 
habitually serve like economic bills of rights that grant foreign investors substantive 
protections and procedural rights for the sake of facilitating the inflow of much 
needed investment. It is widely believed that FDIs enhance the development of 
infrastructure, and delivery of services and jobs, and facilities such as roads, railway 




  note also that investment treaty dispute 
resolution is still in its infancy and that it will determine the future of BIT agreements 
for the promotion and protection of foreign investments one way or the other.
 
 That 
may well depend largely on the perceived balance in the allocation of benefits and 
detriments in the bargain. 
 
A curious question is why SADC States have demonstrated such enthusiasm for the 
BIT framework for the regulation of foreign investments
134
 when it appears that the 
dispute settlement mechanisms that they promote would insulate foreign investments 
from all probable risk of non-commercial risks such as those necessitated by BEE 
policy imperatives, while compelling the host nation to liberalize its economy for the 
optimum exploitation of investment opportunities.
135
 To borrow from Salacuse and 
Sullivan who have thoroughly studied the rapid expansion of BITs, 
The impetus behind the rapid expansion of BITs rests in the desire of companies of 
industrialized States to invest safely and securely in developing countries, as well as the 
consequent need to create a stable international legal framework to facilitate and protect those 
                         
132
  See Susan Franck, above, n.65, 48. 
133
  Exploring the cost benefit theory and analyses, see also Duncan Kennedy, ‘Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A critique’, (1980-81) 33 Stanford Law Review 387-445; Charles 
Brower and Lee Steven, ‘Who the should judge?: Developing the International Rule of Law under 
NAFTA Chapter 11’ (2001) 2 Chigago Journal of International Law  193-202;  Kenneth Vandevelde, 
‘Investment Liberalization and Economic development: The role of bilateral investment treaties’ (1998) 
36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law  501-27. 
134
  Zimbabwe has BITs with Mauritius, a member of the SADC, and also with Indonesia. See 
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties website:  
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 South Africa has BITs with the USA 
(1999); European Community and its Member States (1999); and Canada (1998).  See also 
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=780 
135
  “Bits impose obligations that are similar – and, indeed, that exceed – the obligations imposed 
by the hull rule [even though developing States have always advocated for fewer such legal 
requirements.” Andrew Guzman, ‘Why LCDs sign Treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38 Virginia Journal of International Law  638, 639. 
investments. Without a BIT, international investors are forced to rely on host country law 
alone for protection, which entails a variety of risks to their investments. Host governments 
can easily change their own domestic law after a foreign investment is made, and host country 
officials may not always act fairly or impartially toward foreign investors and their 
enterprises. Investor recourse to local courts for protection may prove to be of little value in 
the face of prejudice against foreigners or governmental interference in the judicial process.
136 
 
So why have SADC States been so keen on BITs for the promotion and protection of 
foreign investments? By accepting the illusory promises of increased capital and 
technology flow necessary to expedite economic development on their territories - 
what Salacuse and Sullivan have described as the ‘grand bargain,’ SADC States that 
are presently focused on implementing BEE policy imperatives may have misjudged 
the inconsistency between their foremost concern (BEE policy) on the one hand, and 





The Tribunal award against the Republic of Zimbabwe in Bernardus Henricus 
Funnekotter et al.
137
 following expropriation of investments belonging to Dutch 
nationals for the purpose of progressing BEE inspired land reform policy that targets 
the undoing of apartheid Rhodesia’s foremost legacy shows that it may still be 
premature for SADC States to commit themselves to the BIT framework of regulating 
international investments particularly because of their standard requirement to refer 
the matter for arbitration with an extra-territorial tribunal such as the ICSID. This is 
largely because the end of apartheid in SADC States did not result in the sudden 
demise of the legal, economic and social structures that had helped create the bitter 
fruits of apartheid-rule. It would be more than ambitious to expect that all had 
suddenly converted to the more liberal universal human rights norm. Indeed many 
still adhere to the tenets of apartheid-rule and invoke whatever means they can to 
oppose its characterisation as an abomination. 
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In the cases of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique apartheid rule 
only ended recently. In Zimbabwe’s case that was after almost a century of apartheid 
governance, – tens of decades in which apartheid rule sowed and nurtured its seeds, 
resulting in an unprecedented undermining of the inherent dignity of indigenous 
populations. Therefore, until a sufficient reversal of the economic and social legacy of 
apartheid rule has occurred that results in the rejection, abandonment and replacement 
of economic, social and legal fruits of apartheid, SADC participation in BITs for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments will remain premature because BIT 
dispute settlement mechanisms care nothing at all for imperatives of BEE policy to 
undo the worst effects of the legacy of apartheid-rule in the sub-region. 
 
The consequent conflict between the BIT dispute settlement mechanisms on the one 
hand, and SADC governments’ prerogative and popular mandate to undo the worst 
effects of the economic and social legacies of apartheid-rule on their territories on the 
other is exemplified in that BITs themselves espouse a requirement of the rule of law 
that inadvertently insists on the recognition and protection of apartheid-rule 
engineered social and economic rights that are tainted with the sceptre of unjust 
enrichment. 
 
For instance Article 6(a) of the BIT for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments concluded between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands states that neither Contracting Party shall subject nationals of the other 
Contracting Party to any measures depriving them, directly or indirectly, of their 
investments unless the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process 
of law. Moreover, by rule of law is meant that Zimbabwe laws do not apply to any 
dispute that may arise. The only applicable laws being the specific BIT standards and 
general international law that is consistent with the BIT instrument itself. This 
suggests a neutering also of the host State’s sovereignty as it cannot refer disputes 
occurring on its own territory to its own national laws. 
 
A further paradox is that BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments 
also habitually espouse requirements of non-discrimination and require the host State 
to ensure to foreign investments treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its 
own nationals even though nationals of host States have no BIT arbitration procedures 
to resort to. 
 
Article 6(b) of the BIT between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands states that neither Contracting Party shall subject nationals of the other 
Contracting Party to any measures that are discriminatory or contrary to any 
undertaking that the former Contracting Party may have given. BITs for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments habitually invoke the non-
discrimination standard to perpetuate antiquated exclusions of indigenous populations 
from participating in the exploitation of their own natural resources.
138
  This can 
perpetuate the marginalisation of host States’ indigenous populations’ involvement in 
their own economies, resulting in tensions with enormous potential to create 
emergencies. The Zimbabwe land tensions are a case in point. 
 
Yet another paradox refers to the much talked about bargain element in BITs for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments. It is commonly stated that 
developing States conclude BITs with capital exporting countries in order to promote 
foreign investment.
139
 BIT dispute settlement mechanisms facilitate the creation of 
procedural rights that allow investors to enforce substantive rights contained in the 
particular BIT agreement for the promotion and protection of foreign investments. But 
as happened in the case of Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter et al., when the interests 
of foreign investors conflict with BEE inspired constitutional changes, BITs tend to 
provide investors the opportunity to invoke substantive rights through the procedural 
rights guaranteed in the dispute settlement mechanism. This process is blind to the 
contextual realities of the host State and in Shylock manner
140
 enables the investor to 
insist upon his/her pound of flesh, even if the State only has grams of flesh left on the 
emaciated skeleton of its crumbling economy instead. 
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Conclusions 
 
This article examined the sustainability of two concurrent practices in the SADC. One 
is the emergent BEE norm of CIL that is now the focus of new governmental 
departments with advisory councils that monitor, evaluate and influence its progress. 
Its purpose is to substitute equality that facilitates broad based black participation in 
the economy of the SADC, for inequality that had been orchestrated by the practice of 
apartheid-rule for almost a century in the sub-region. 
 
The other is the potential impact of the emergent jurisprudence on the regulation of 
SADC/European BITs for the promotion and protection of foreign investments to 
disrupt BEE policies of SADC governments that are seeking to counter the worst 
effects of apartheid-rule on their territories.  The article has shown that the dispute 
settlement mechanisms common to SADC/European BITs for the promotion and 
protection of foreign investments places European foreign nationals/investors  in a 
much stronger position against SADC States than was the case under the former CIL 
framework espoused by the Hull Rule.
141 
Emergent jurisprudence shows that foreign 
investors to the sub-region are ruthlessly resorting to arbitrating against BEE policies 
that they regard as a non-commercial nuisance to their investments. This is all 
happening at a time when SADC States could do without and distractions from the 
task of dismantling the economic and social effects of apartheid-rule on their 
territories for more than half a century. 
 
The article has shown that the mutually antithetical dispute settlement mechanisms 
contained in SADC/European agreements for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments on the one hand; and drive to accomplish BEE on the other, makes it 
premature for SADC States to participate in this type of BIT framework for the 
regulation of foreign investments because of its opposition to their own basic norm on 
social reconstruction. Their participation in this type of framework risks 
compromising their popular mandate to manage and correct the social and economic 
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legacies of apartheid-rule that are still very prominent in their societies.  Because the 
procedures common to the dispute settlement mechanisms of SADC/European BITs 
habitually elevate the competencies of foreign nationals to a level equal to that of 
States under international law, they serve also to cap the sovereign competencies of 
the host SADC States. 
 
To stand a chance of benefiting anything at all from the emergent BIT framework of 
regulating foreign investments, SADC States could exclude all investments that are 
still hinged to as yet unresolved legacies of apartheid-rule on their territories. 
Otherwise, their whole campaign against apartheid-rule will have been in vain. One 
way of ensuring this is to limit the areas of investment to be opened to foreign 
investors under any BIT agreement for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investments to only those areas that do not require BEE inspired intervention in order 
to offset the manifest effects of the economic and social legacies of apartheid.  
 
In particular, foreign investments that are linked to commercial farm holdings appear 
to be a premature activity for post-apartheid SADC States, especially South Africa, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe in light of their BEE policies for countering the economic 
and social legacy of apartheid-rule on their territories for over half a century. Perhaps 
only after a successful completion of their BEE campaigns to diminish or undo 
apartheid-rule’s legacy in land allocation in these States could certain sectors of their 
economies become suitable for standard BIT regulated foreign investments. The 
decision in Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter et al.
142
 shows that these States would be 
committing social, developmental and financial suicide if they proceeded otherwise. 
European interests will be best secured in the SADC by approaches that support and not 
appear to oppose BEE policies. 
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